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serve to restrain the transfer or encumbrance by the husband of
his realty. United States v. Spangler, 94 F. Supp. 301 (W. Va.
1950). Under the present law of West Virginia there seems to be
no way to discharge the lien. United States v. Spangler, supra.
This is true though the husband has never defaulted in payment,
is solvent and apparently will remain solvent. Since the position
of our court is well settled, it would seem that the problem is a
proper one for legislation. A procedure should be provided whereby,
in a proper case, the lien could be discharged. For example, the
legislature could provide for a lump sum payment of the future
installments to become due based on the life expectancy of the
wife.
Public policy should not support a rule of law which operates
as a major restraint upon alienation of realty.
L. H. H.

FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION-CONDITIONAL BEQUESTS TO

CHARITY

established a testamentary trust for the joint
lives of his wife and daughter, and the life of the survivor, with remainder to the living descendants of the daughter, or in their
absence, one-half to collateral relatives and one-half to a charity,
or if no named collaterals then survived, all to the charity. At
S's death his daughter was twenty-seven years old, divorced, and
childless. The executor deducted in the estate tax return the
actuarially computed present value of the conditional bequest of
one-half of the residue, without deduction for the half subject to
the more remote contingency. The deduction was disallowed by
the commissioner but sustained by the tax court in Estate of Sternberger v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 836 (1952), afJ'd, 207 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.
1953). Held, reversed. No deduction is allowable unless the
possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible.
Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger, 75 Sup. Ct. 229 (1955) (6-2
decision.)
The statute allows deduction from the gross estate of transfers
for public, charitable, or religious uses in determining the taxable
-No

DEDU0TION.-S

estate.

INT.

REV.

CODE § 812 (d). These provisions remain un-

changed in the 1954 code. Id. at §§ 2051, 2055.
Humes v. United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1927), established the
doctrine that this does not authorize deduction for a contingent
gift to a charity where the bequest is incapable of evaluation in a

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 15
CASE COMMENTS
case where the charitable gift was to be defeated if a fifteen-yearold unmarried girl should live to be forty or should die leaving
issue. The doctrine has been applied in a variety of situations.
United States v. Fourth National Bank in Wichita, 83 F.2d 85
(10th Cir. 1936) (bequest failed unless others should contribute
an equal amount to the charitable cause); Helvering v. Union
Trust Co., 125 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1942) (periodic payments to the
charity were dependent on continued use of a country home left
to the charity for defined purposes); Norris v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d
796 (7th Cir. 1943) (payments were purely at the trustees' option);
First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Reynolds, 137 F.2d 518 (8th Gir.
1943) (bequest was contingent upon the consent of the testator's
spouse).
But where surgery had made it impossible for the
daughter to have children, the charity was assured of taking and
deduction was allowed. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291
U.S. 272 (1934).
Whether actuarial susceptibility of evaluation was sufficient
as well as a necessary condition for deductibility gave rise to conflict among the circuits. In Meierhof v. Higgins, 129 F.2d 1002
(2d Cir. 1942), where a conditional bequest to charity, after life
estates to two beneficiaries, aged seventy-four and seventy-nine,
was defeasible if the widow, aged seventy-one survived them, the
gift was held deductible to the extent of its actuarially computed
value against objections as to its speculative character. There followed a treasury regulation that "if as of the date of decedent's
death the transfer to charity is dependent upon the performance
of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that
it might become effective, no deduction is allowable unless the
possibility that charity will not take is so remote as to be negligible."
U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.46 (1942). Relying on this regulation
Newton Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947), held
that no deduction was allowable where a life interest to testator's
widow was followed by a remainder to his brother if he survived
her, otherwise to charity, and the brother's and the widow's actuarial life expectancy was the same. The possibility that charity
would not take was not so remote as to be negligible.
Adherence by the second circuit to its doctrine in the present
case, 207 F.2d 600, led to a grant of certiorari to resolve the
conflict. Comm'r v. Estate of Sternberger, 347 U.S. 932 (1954).
The court adheres to the Humes doctrine and amplifies it, holding
that along with actuarial computability, the chance charity will
not take must be so remote as to be negligible. The dissent takes
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substantialy the position of the Meierhof case to which it refers.
The opposition of the treasury regulation and the Meierhof
doctrine had been commented on. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiwT
TAXATION § 12.24 (Supp. 1946). To sustain either was to discard
the other. The Court has expressed its election in the instant
case with the result that contingent charitable gifts must now
satisfy a double test to get estate tax deduction. It must be capable
of evaluation, unless as in the Provident Trust case, the charity is
assured of taking; and even though it may be actuarially computable, the possibility of the charity's not taking must be so
remote as to be negligible.

J. L. McC.

JUVENILE

COURTS-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND RULES OF Evi-

APPLICABLE.-In delinquency proceedings against a minor
in the Philadelphia juvenile court, the minor was shown to have
operated an automobile without the owner's consent and without
a driver's license. Guilty knowledge of the theft of the car was
not shown. The child was adjudged delinquent after admitting
that he was not a licensed driver. A later delinquency petition
alleged his participation in an armed robbery and, at the hearing,
a detective testified that a person who confessed to the armed
robbery had implicated the minor, who was shown to have been
before the juvenile authorities several times before. The court
committed him to a training school and he appealed, complaining
that the juvenile court compelled him to answer a self-incriminat.
ing question and that testimony as to the confession was inadmissible hearsay. Held, commitment sustained; juvenile courts are
not criminal courts to which the constitutional rights granted to
persons accused of crime are applicable and the nature of their
hearings renders inapplicable the rules of evidence applied in
criminal trials. In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1954).
It seems to be well accepted today that a minor is not entitled
in juvenile court proceedings to all the constitutional safeguards
available to the adult criminal. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183
N.E. 353 (1932); cf. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678
(1923) (contra on evidence point of principal case); Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 Haxv. L. REv. 104 (1909); Comment, 35 VA. L.
REv. 1097 (1949). The functions of the juvenile court are considered so important that the limitations of the Constitution are
DENCE
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